In recent years, the Sinicization of Christianity (as part of the “Sinicization of Religions”), as an important requirement from the Chinese leadership and an official directive from the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and its religious bureaus at all levels (formerly the “State Administration for Religious Affairs” and Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau in all provinces and cities), has become not only the focus of work for the Christian churches throughout China, but also a topic of discussion in Chinese religious studies.1
The authorities’ demand was driven by the strategic concern over religious influence of “hostile forces from the West” and the political need for nationalist-statist ideology. The churches’ response was driven by the social condition of “politics’ domination over religion,” which was rooted in the Chinese tradition and has been further reinforced since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was founded.
What distinguishes the current situation is the unprecedented intensity of the authorities’ demands and the corresponding efforts by the church. This time, the resources and energy invested by the churches, along with the visible—though often superficial—outcomes, have reached unparalleled levels. At the same time, the related academics’ engagement with the topic in line with the above direction is more evident than ever, as they have found that it is relatively easy to get governmental funding for research on “Sinicization” in the direction and to publish related essays in academic journals.2
What, then, is, the significance of the proposition “Christianity should be Sinicized” (the meaning of “Sinicization of Christianity”), from the perspective of religious studies (including philosophy and history of religion)?
We can first examine it from the perspective of theory or concept.
The demand for the “nationalization” or “ethnicization” of religions should not entail transforming religions into something non-religious or requiring them to renounce the very essence that defines them. In other words, it is not a call for the “de-religionization” of religion. Just as every entity has its own essence (i.e., those fundamental qualities that, if lost, will strip it of its unique identity), so too does religion. To demand that a religion relinquish its essence is as absurd and impossible as asking a chicken to become a duck.
Similarly, the call for the “nationalization” or “ethnicization” of a specific religion should not demand that it transform into another religion or abandon its core teachings. Every religion possesses an intrinsic essence, expressed through its fundamental doctrines, that distinguishes it from other religions. These teachings cannot simply be renounced. For instance, the Sinicization of Buddhism does not imply that Buddhism should become Taoism. Likewise, the Sinicization of Islam and Christianity does not suggest that they should morph into Buddhism or Taoism.
So, what does it mean for a religion to be “nationalized” or “ethnicized” (and for any religion to be “Sinicized”)? From the perspective of religious studies, all religions consist of intangible ideological concepts and emotional experiences rooted in a belief system. These intangible elements require tangible expressions, such as behavioral practices and organizational structures, with language serving as the backbone.3 The intangible elements are intrinsic, inherent, and relatively stable, and do not change due to external forces. In contrast, the tangible elements—external, subordinate, and more variable—are shaped by external circumstances. The former embodies the inner essence of the religion, which, if transformed to a certain extent, would fundamentally change the religion itself. The latter, however, pertains to the external form of the religion. When adjusted and adapted to meet the needs of a specific social environment, these external elements can facilitate the smoother spread and development of the religion within that context.
Therefore, the “nationalization” or “ethnicization” of a religion does not mean transforming it into another religion or abandoning its spiritual faith and essential content. Instead, it just means taking on the related nation’s (or ethnic group’s) expressive forms, first language, then arts and various cultural forms, and behavioral practices and organizational structures pertaining to the local environment. However, it is vitally important to remember that form must serve content—forms such as language and the arts are merely means of religion, while spiritual faith alone is its ultimate purpose.
In this way, the “Sinicization” movement, which embraces the Chinese language, arts (including painting, sculpture, architecture and music), and other cultural expressions—without necessarily rejecting foreign influences—should be understood as a means rather than an end. It does not serve as the ultimate end of a religion but enables it to thrive and develop more effectively. This is the broader significance of the “Sinicization” of any religion, including Christianity.
However, we can identify different answers to this question, from the perspective of history or facts.
Firstly, since the dawn of civilization, every religion has emerged in the cultural milieu of a certain ethnic group or nation. Most religions have naturally expressed themselves through the cultural forms of their place of origin. Their languages, arts and other expressions have often been characterized by the national features of their context. For the majority of these religions, which remain confined to their home countries, there is little need to advocate for “nationalization” or “ethnicization,” as they have been inherently “nationalized” or “ethnicized”. For example, it is meaningless to call for “Sinicization” of Taoism, for “Japanization” of Shintoism or for “Indianization” of Hinduism. Scholars of religion often categorize these religions as “national or ethnic religions” as opposed to “world religions”.
Of course, if some religions in this category begin to spread beyond their original borders, with some new ideas or circumstances due to the changes of history, they would require a degree of “domestication” or “transformation.” However, this process is not a matter of “nationalization,” but on the contrary, involves a form of “foreignization.” Therefore, only by embracing the cultural forms of the target society or target nation can these religions successfully spread and establish themselves. For instance, Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism, when disseminated beyond their homelands, have had to incorporate aspects of foreign cultures, lifestyles and languages, such as English, to facilitate their spread.
Secondly, another category of religions in the history of civilization—the “world religions,” as opposed to “national religions”—also emerged within the cultural context of specific nations. However, driven by their universal beliefs or concepts, these religions aspire to spread globally. The so-called “three great world religions”—Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam—are prime examples. With this purpose, from their inception, these religions have sought to transcend the cultural and geographical limitations of their origins, such as Judea, Kapilvastu and Arabia. They (to different extents) incorporated the cultural characteristics of their target nations, adapting their language, arts and even explanations of doctrines to the target populations. This adaption has enabled them to achieve remarkable success in foreign contexts, not only spreading across the world but also becoming integral to the cultures and national identities of the regions they reached. In essence, the process of “nationalization” in the countries to which they spread has been both a necessity and a natural outcome. Consequently, asking these religions to “nationalize” themselves is redundant, as they have consistently pursued, realized, and kept continuing to achieve such a goal, as part of their global expansion. For them, such a demand holds little practical significance.
This fact is particularly evident in the case of the “Sinicization of Christianity.” From its first documented entry into China during the reign of Emperor Taizong in the Tang Dynasty (7th century CE), Christianity demonstrated a remarkable degree of active and conscious adaptationto Chinese culture. This is evident in various aspects, such as its Chinese name, “Jingjiao (meaning Bright Teaching),” the designation of its places of worship as “si (temples),” and the creation of artifacts like the Jingjiao Stele (also known as the Nestorian Stele), which recorded the spread of early Chinese Christianity from the Da Qin (or Roman Empire). The Stele’s “Ode” and “Preface” reflected an emphasis on harmony between church and state. Additionally, many of the Jingjiao literature from that period employed Buddhist and Taoist terminology. All of these showcased the high level of Sinicization of Christianity at that time. Emperor Taizong announced this teaching (Christianity) as “benevolent and beneficial to people and suitable for the whole world,” highlighting its level of acceptance within Chinese society. Scholars of religion have also noted that during Emperor Wuzong’s anti-Buddhist campaign, Christianity was confused and grouped with Buddhism and suffered similar persecution—this is further evidence of its deep cultural integration with Chinese traditions.
During the late Ming and early Qing dynasties (17th century CE) when Christianity began to take root in Chinese society, Matteo Ricci and other Jesuits, who represented the highest achievement of missionaries at that time, followed a radical “Sinicization” policy––they not only took on Confucian robes and spoke Chinese, but also learned Confucian and other Chinese classics and introduced them to the West; not only opposed the “anti-Sinicization” direction from the Pontiff, but also made all efforts to express Christian concepts in Chinese terms; even today’s Chinese scholars imbued with traditional literature would highly admire the beautiful style of those missionaries’ works in classical Chinese.
From the nineteenth century to the present, the “Sinicization” of Christianity in China has been much more evident in various ways. It is reflected in the collaborative efforts between foreign missionaries and Chinese locals to translate the Bible into Chinese and the countless Christian works written by native literati and scholars in Chinese language. It can also be seen in the involvement of missionaries in the Western Affairs Movement4 and the Hundred Day’s Reform, as well as the significant contributions of Chinese Christian elites in politics, business and culture to various aspects of Chinese society—science and technology, education and scholarship, medicine and public health, journalism and publishing, philanthropy and social services, and so on. Moreover, the advocacy by both Chinese and foreign church leaders for a “self-reliant” Chinese church and the eventual establishment of the “three-self” principles (self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation) marks further milestones in this process. All these efforts and achievements have showcased that the “Sinicization” of Christianity in China has already been fully realized.
All in all, today’s Chinese Christians are mostly ordinary Chinese people who have grown up in China and are immersed in Chinese culture. Most of them have very little knowledge of foreign languages and cultures. Their Christianity has endured over 1,300 years of history in China, weathering many challenges and undergoing a long course of “assimilation.” For much of history, Christianity in China has been largely isolated from the outside world. All of this raises a question: Do Chinese Christians today need more “Sinicization,” or would they benefit more from “going out and inviting in”—fostering broader and deeper exchanges with their brothers and sisters around the world?
Of course, the conclusions drawn here are from academic, religious, and historical perspectives. Perhaps from a political standpoint, the “Sinicization of Christianity” may carry its own significant and practical implications, but that lies beyond the scope of this essay.
Editor’s note: This article was originally written in Chinese and has been translated and edited by the ChinaSource team with the author’s permission and approval.
- During recent visits to churches in Guangzhou and in Wenzhou—including those directly and indirectly managed by the China Christian Council and the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (CCC&TSPM)—I observed forceful propaganda focusing on the “Sinicization of Christianity.” This was apparent in various ways, such as large slogans displayed in church courtyards and content on bulletin boards. The most prominent spaces were dedicated to showcasing related speeches by Party leader Xi. In fact, online photos frequently depict religious groups holding meetings to study the leader’s speeches and ceremonies of lifting national flag in temples of various religions, among which even Taoism, the native Chinese religion, is doing such “Sinicization of Religion.”
- In China, private funding for research in the humanities and social sciences is very rare and difficult to operate, and academic journals require official approval to publish. Among state-funded programs in these fields, topics related to religion are quite limited; essays related Christianity in the scarce religious journals face even stricter censorship.
- Cf. He Guanghu 何光滬, “Religion,” in A Dictionary of Religions, ed. Jiyu Ren (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, 2009).
- Editor’s note: “洋務運動, often called “the Self-Strengthening Movement” (自強運動), also known as the Westernization or Western Affairs Movement (c. 1861–1895), was a period of radical institutional reforms initiated in China during the late Qing dynasty following the military disasters of the Opium Wars.
